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Modeling A Remedy For Racial Profiling
After the School Desegregation Cases
Jeremiah Wagner*
Introduction
Prior to 1954, Black students were not permitted to attend
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.1 But, in 1954, the
Supreme Court decided Brown v. The Board of Education I (Brown
1)2 and declared that schools could no longer deny admittance on
the basis of race. 3 A year later, the Supreme Court decided Brown
v. The Board of Education II (Brown II)4 and required all school
boards to desegregate their respective schools.5 In order to comply
with the decisions of the Court, Central High's school board
adopted a plan permitting Black students to attend the school
beginning in the fall of 1957.6 However, the day before the plan's
J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School. M.B.A. expected
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1. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (indicating that Black students were
not admitted to Central High School as of May 20, 1954).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See id. at 495 (holding that students who had been denied admittance on the
basis of their race were "deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment").
4. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. See id. at 299 (holding that "[s]chool authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving . . . problems" arising from
unconstitutional school segregation).
6. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7-8.
On May 20, 1954 ... the Little Rock District School Board adopted, and on
May 23, 1954, made public, a statement of policy entitled "Supreme Court
Decision-Segregation in Public Schools." In this statement the Board
recognized that
"It is our responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional
Requirements and we intend to do so when the Supreme Court of
the United States outlines the method to be followed."
Thereafter the Board undertook studies of the administrative problems
confronting the transition to a desegregated public school system at Little
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implementation, Governor Orval Faubus 7 declared Little Rock
Central High School off limits to Black students.8 To enforce his
declaration, Faubus went so far as to order the Arkansas National
Guard to block any Black students from entering Central High
School. 9 The federal government eventually intervened and, under
the protection of the Little Rock Police Department, Black
students entered Central High School on September 23, 1957.10
In 1992, Robert Wilkins, a Black male from Washington,
D.C., drove to a family funeral in Ohio.1 Following the funeral,
Wilkins rented a Cadillac and, with his aunt, uncle, and cousin,
began the return trip home to Washington, D.C.12 While passing
through Maryland, the group was pulled over for speeding while
driving at sixty miles per hour on the interstate. 13 Wilkins and his
family were ordered out of the vehicle, and as they stood in the
rain on the side of the interstate, several officers and drug-sniffing
dogs searched their vehicle for drugs. 14 In the end, no drugs were
found. 15 Wilkins and his family were victims of racial profiling. 16
Rock. It instructed the Superintendent of Schools to prepare a plan for
desegregation, and approved such a plan on May 24, 1955, seven days
before the second Brown opinion. The plan provided for desegregation at
the senior high school level (grades 10 through 12) as the first stage.
Desegregation at the junior high and elementary levels was to follow. It
was contemplated that desegregation at the high school level would
commence in the fall of 1957, and the expectation was that complete
desegregation of the school system would be accomplished by 1963.
Id.
7. See CRAIG RAINS/PUB. RELATIONS INC., LITTLE ROCK CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL
40TH ANNIVERSARY, at http://www.centralhigh57.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2003)
(indicating that Orval Faubus was the governor of Arkansas in 1957) [hereinafter
LITTLE ROCK 40TH ANNIVERSARY].
8. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 9 (indicating that "the Governor of Arkansas . . .
placed the school 'off limits' to colored students").
9. See id.
10. See id. at 12 (stating that on Monday, September 23, 1957, "[t]he Negro
children entered the high school . . . under the protection of the Little Rock Police
Department"); see also LITTLE ROCK 40 T H ANNIVERSARY, supra note 7 (providing a
detailed account of the events that transpired at Little Rock Central High School in
1957).
11. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FREEDOM NETWORK, "DRIVING WHILE
BLACK" Is NOT A CRIME . . . So WHY ARE INCIDENTS LIKE THESE OCCURRING
ACROSS THE COUNTRY?, at http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/tales (last visited Nov. 3,





16. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan 1. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial
Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses
Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2000) (indicating that pretext stops are the
most common examples of racial profiling); see also Samuel R. Gross & Debra
RACIAL (DE)PROFILING
At first glance, racial profiling and school segregation do not
seem to have much in common. In fact, racial profiling and school
segregation are consistently viewed as two very distinct issues,
especially in the legal system. For example, the Supreme Court
has declared school segregation unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but no such
ruling has been made for racial profiling. 17
This Article argues, however, that racial profiling is a form of
segregation that should be declared unconstitutional for the same
reasons that school segregation was declared unconstitutional.
This Article argues further that the remedial approach taken in
the school desegregation cases following the Court's decision in
Brown I provides an ideal model for remedying racial profiling.
Part I of this Article provides a background of racial profiling-
specifically, how it is defined, when it is applied, and the extent of
its existence. 18 Part II explains a private racial profiling Equal
Protection claim brought under the guise of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's holding in Brown I that
struck down school segregation, and the model the Court applied
in latter cases to effectuate school desegregation. 20  Part IV
compares racial profiling to school segregation and argues that
racial profiling is a form of unconstitutional racial segregation. 21
Part V then demonstrates how the courts can follow the
methodology used in the school desegregation cases to create an
effective model for racial (de)profiling.22
I. The Background of Racial Profiling
A. Racial Profiling Defined
The first step in a discussion of racial profiling is to define
racial profiling. 23  While this may seem an easy task, it is
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002)
("Police officers would stop, question, and search African American and Hispanic
citizens disproportionately, because of their race or ethnicity, in order to try to
catch common criminals."); DRIVING WHILE BLACK, supra note 11 (detailing several
instances of racial profiling).
17. See infra notes 60-125 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 23.58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 60-105 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 106-155 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 156-203 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 204-221 and accompanying text.
23. Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
41, 106 (2001) (quoting Los Angeles Police Chief Bernard C. Parks as stating that
2004]
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complicated by the fact that there is no social or legal consensus on
a definition. 24 For example, consider that as recently as the 1970s
and 1980s, the closest the courts came to using the term "racial
profiling" was to use the term "racial profile" to describe the racial
compositions of schools, 25 businesses, 26 and model neighborhoods. 27
To this date, the Supreme Court has yet to provide a definition of
racial profiling; in fact, the term only appears in two Supreme
Court cases.28
Even though there is no consensus on the exact definition of
racial profiling, the term's origins and use in common parlance
provide an effective definition. The actual term "racial profiling" is
a relatively recent offshoot of the "drug courier profiles" created in
the 1980s for use in the "war on drugs."29  The "drug courier
profile" began as an element of Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) training programs, such as Operation Pipeline, that are
designed to inform federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies of the best practices for spotting drug traffickers on the
highways, in the airports, and on the sidewalks. 30 Specifically, the
"[u]ntil they define [racial profiling], we can't really discuss it .. .[because] [iut
means too many things to too many people").
24. See JIM CLEARY, MINN. H.R., RACIAL PROFILING STUDIES IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY (2000) (indicating that there is not yet a
clear consensus on the definition of racial profiling); David Rudovsky, Breaking the
Pattern of Racial Profiling, 38 TRIAL 29, 36 (2002) (indicating that there is an
ongoing debate over the exact definition of racial profiling).
25. NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1977) (using
"racial profile" to reference the racial composition of particular schools).
26. Greer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (using
"racial profile" to describe the racial composition of those employed at General
Motors); NAACP v. Wilmington, 453 F. Supp. 330, 342 (D. Del. 1978) (using "racial
profile" to describe the racial composition of those employed at the Wilmington
Medical Center).
27. Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 317 F. Supp. 555, 562 (E.D. Va. 1970) ('The racial profile
of the Model Neighborhood does not provide an ethnic mix which is representative
of total city population .... ."' (quoting uncited Model Neighborhood Planning
Grant application submitted by City of Richmond to Dep't of Housing & Urban
Development)).
28. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (using the term "racial profiling" without providing its definition); see
also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 nn.9-10 (2000) (discussing racial
profiling without providing its definition).
29. See Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 766 (2002)
("Racial profiling is inextricably intertwined with.., the war on drugs giving birth
to the 'drug courier profile,' the prototype for the more general racial profile."); see
also Garrett, supra note 23, at 49 ("Racial profiling traditionally referred to actual
written profiles of suspects, primarily drug courier profiles.").
30. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA
AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS, GAO/GGD-00-41, 4 (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter GAO




"drug courier profile" was an accumulation of rather innocuous
facts, such as age, clothing, and often race, that when combined,
purported to describe the stereotypical drug trafficker. 31
Law enforcement agencies across the United States
aggressively employed the "drug courier profile," and as the "war
on drugs" progressed, racial minorities became noticeably over-
represented in criminal and incarceration statistics. 32  Such
agencies rationalized this over-representation with the belief that
race accurately predicts an individual's or a group's propensity to
commit crime.33 Eventually, the use of race in various criminal
31. See William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, Challenging Racial Profiles:
Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 387, 390
(2001) ("Profiles are not an accumulation of individualized facts upon which
probable cause or reasonable suspicion attach to a suspect. Instead, profiles are an
accumulation of often innocent facts which supposedly justify police detention,
search, or both of suspects."); see also United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412,
1432 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1409 (6th Cir.
1990) (indicating that "the 'war on drugs' has resulted in the stopping and
searching of individuals based exclusively upon race")).
32. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (vol. 12, no. 2(G)) (2000) available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/RcedrgOO-05.htm#P307_63738 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] ('The war on drugs precipitated
soaring arrests of drug offenders and increasing racial disproportions among the
arrestees."). This report indicated that:
Blacks had long been arrested for drug offenses at higher rates than
whites. Throughout the 1970s, for example, blacks were approximately
twice as likely as whites to be arrested for drug-related offences. By 1988,
however, with national anti-drug efforts in full force, blacks were arrested
on drug charges at five times the rate of whites. Nationwide, blacks
constituted 37 percent of all drug arrestees; in large urban areas, blacks
constituted 53 percent of all drug arrestees.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Suzanne Leone, Massachusetts Addresses Racial
Profiling Head On: The Efficiency of Chapter 228 of the Acts and Resolves of 2000,
28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 335, 337 (2002) citing David A.
Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on our Nation's Highways, An
American Civil Liberties Union Special Report, (June 1999) at
http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) ("Even
though 'this stereotype [racial profiling] is factually untrue, it has nonetheless
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because police look for drugs primarily among
African Americans and Latinos, they find a disproportionate number of minorities
in possession of contraband."').
33. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 16, at 14-15 ("As we use the term, 'racial
profiling' occurs whenever a law enforcement officer .. . investigates a person
because the officer believes that members of that person's racial ... group are more
likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is
investigating."); see also Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction:
Racial Inequality, Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 443, 450 (2001) ("While the abuse of illegal substances is primarily a
private health problem for middle and upper class, predominantly white,
Americans, it is invariably a nationally fought, criminalized 'war' against a
disproportionately poor African American and Latino/a American population."); see
also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 138 (Vintage Books 1998)
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profiles evolved into the term "racial profiling."3 4 Today, racial
profiling is generally thought of as "the practice of a law
enforcement agent relying, to any degree, on race ... in selecting
which individuals to subject to routine investigatory [activities] ," '3 5
or more generally stated, the practice of using race as a proxy for
criminality. 36
B. Law Enforcement Discretion
Beyond defining racial profiling, it is also necessary to
recognize that racial profiling exists "on a continuum based on the
degree to which an officer has the discretion to choose whether or
not to make the stop."37  The continuum progresses from low-
discretion decisions, in which facts compel an agent to investigate
an individual, to high-discretion decisions, in which a decision is
really only limited by personal opinion and experience.38 For
example, low-discretion decisions often involve an external
description of a particular suspect, such as "a motorist running a
(1997) (detailing an early belief that race was a proxy for criminal propensity).
34. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 49 (indicating that racial profiling evolved from
the "drug courier profile"); see also DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS:
PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000) ("In the late 1990s, the
American news media exploded with coverage of the problem of racial profiling."),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffileslfbja/184768.pdf (last visited Sept. 26,
2003).
35. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. §§ 101, 501(5)
(2001) (purporting to define and prohibit racial profiling), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bingetdoc.cgi?dbname=107 cong bills&docid=f:s989is.txt.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2003); see also United States v. Coleman, 162 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(detailing a Texas statute that defined racial profiling as "law enforcement-
initiated action based on an individual's race, ethnicity, or national origin rather
than on the individual's behavior or on information identifying the individual as
having engaged in criminal activity"); see also CLEARY, supra note 24, at 6 ("Racial
profiling occurs when a law enforcement officer uses race or ethnicity as one of
several factors in deciding to stop, question, arrest, and/or search someone.").
36. See Luna, supra note 29, at 764.
[R]acial profiling can be defined as the use of race as a proxy for crime,
allegedly justified by a propensity toward crime which, in turn, justifies
the detention and search of individuals in public spaces-standing or
walking on the streets, driving on highways, commuting on buses or
trains, flying on airplanes and engaging in other activities of modern life.
Id.
37. See CLEARY, supra note 24, at 13.
38. GEORGE L. KELLING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, "BROKEN WINDOWS" AND POLICE
DISCRETION 38 (1999) (stating that police decisions "can be ranked along a
continuum from the cut-and-dried to the problematic") (quoting David H. Bayley &
Egon Bittner, Learning the Skills of Policing, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. NO. 4,
35, 36 (1984)), available at http://www.njcrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/178259.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003).
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red light, or speeding by more than 8 to 10 miles per hour over the
limit, or driving in a manner suggesting alcohol or chemical
impairment."3 9  High-discretion decisions, on the other hand,
involve minor offenses, such as "failure to signal a turn, or a
vehicle with underinflated tires, an unlighted license plate . . .
something hanging from the mirror," or a pedestrian that "looks
suspicious but is not engaged in any specific criminal behavior." 40
The discretion continuum is important because low-discretion
decisions are generally excluded from the definition of racial
profiling. For example, in Brown v. City of Oneonta,41 the Second
Circuit explicitly refused to extend the definition of racial profiling
to include instances where a law enforcement agent possessed a
description of a particular criminal suspect. 42 The Second Circuit
held that "where law enforcement officials possessed a description
of a criminal suspect, even though that description consisted
primarily of the suspect's race . . . they could act on the basis of
that description without violating the Equal Protection Clause."43
When an agent makes a low-discretion decision, such as the one
described in Brown v. City of Oneonta, race is not being used as a
proxy for criminality-rather, race is a specific component of actual
criminal conduct. Therefore, racial profiling is irrelevant when the
facts and circumstances compel a law enforcement agent to
exercise discretion. 44
C. Racial Profiling: Reality or Myth?
Some law enforcement officials argue that racial profiling is
simply a "myth" that is the unfortunate byproduct of sound
39. See CLEARY, supra note 24, at 13.
40. See id. at 14 (referencing Prof. Deborah Ramirez).
41. 221 F.3d 329 (2nd Cir. 2000).
42. See id. at 333-34.
43. See id.
44. See KELLING, supra note 38, at 38 (quoting David H. Bayley & Egon Bittner,
Learning the Skills of Policing, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 35, 36 (1984)).
American officers have few doubts about what to do when a man is found
drunk lying on the ground in the winter. He must be picked up and taken
to a shelter. The choices are also fairly limited in serious traffic accidents,
alleged housebreaking, and assault with a deadly weapon witnessed by a
police officer. This is not to argue that some choices are not involved in
such cases-officers can turn a blind eye or overreact-but rather that the
appropriate responses are clearly recognized by everyone involved-
patrolman, public, and command officers.
The appropriate action may not be easy to take, but it is obvious. When
officers, regardless of their motivations, fail to do what they should,
'discretion' is no excuse.
Id. (citation omitted).
20041
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policing.45 These officials deny the existence of racial profiling,
and assert that disproportionate arrest and incarceration statistics
exist because law enforcement agencies "have made the policy
choice to pursue aggressive strategies of enforcement" that rely on
factors other than race, such as ."class, crime patterns, and
neighborhoods." 46
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the practice
of racial profiling is widespread. For example, Rep. John Conyers
Jr., D-Mich., noted that while "African-Americans make up only 14
percent of the U.S. population, they account for 72 percent of all
routine traffic stops." 47 Also, a New Jersey study indicated that
Black and Hispanic motorists represent 13.5 % of highway drivers
in that state, but that they represent 73.2 % of those stopped and
searched by the New Jersey State Patrol. 48 Similar statistics can
be found for other states, such as Maryland, 49 Illinois,50 and
Minnesota.5 1  There is also evidence indicating that racial
minorities are disproportionately stopped and searched in
airports 52 and on the streets. 53
45. Heather Mac Donald, The Racial Profiling Myth Debunked, 12 CITY JOURNAL
No. 2, at 63 (Spring 2002) (arguing that racial profiling is a myth); see also Garrett,
supra note 23, at 56 (indicating that many critics of racial profiling refer to it as a
myth); see also Buckman & Lamberth, supra note 31, at 387 ("Despite
overwhelming evidence of its vitality, law enforcement denies its existence, hides
the evidence of its perpetration, and criticizes those who even dare to complain.").
46. Garrett, supra note 23, at 56-57.
47. Elizabeth Rogers, Fear of Driving, 86 A.B.A. J. 94, 94 (2000).
48. CLEARY, supra note 24, at 7.
49. See id. (indicating that a Maryland report "revealed that, though black
motorists made up only 17.5 percent of the drivers on certain roadways, they
composed more than 72 percent of the motorists stopped and searched by the
Maryland State Police").
50. See id. (indicating that an Illinois study "showed that, although Hispanics
make up less than 8 percent of the state's population, they were 27 percent of those
stopped and searched by a highway drug interdiction unit").
51. See COUNCI' ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, MINNEAPOLIS POLICE AND TRAFFIC
STOPS AND DRIVERS' RACE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (Apr. 13, 2001)
(indicating that racial- minorities represent fifty-seven percent of the recorded
traffic stops while accounting for just under thirty-five percent of the population),
available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cityworklpolice/statsMpls-Traffic-
Stops.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2003).
52. See CLEARY, supra note 24, at 7-8 (noting a General Accounting Office report
indicating that "of the passengers returning to U.S. airports on international flights
during 1997 and 1998 who were selected by customs officials for personal searches,
a disproportionate number of African American women were subjected to more
invasive searches...").
53. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK"
PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL vii (1999) (indicating that "minorities-and
blacks in particular-were 'stopped' at a higher rate than whites, relative to their
2004] RACIAL (DE)PROFILING
Regardless of its prevalence, the public widely considers
racial profiling to be a significant social problem. 54 As a result,
three approaches are commonly taken to combat racial profiling:
(1) private litigation, 5  (2) legislation,5 6 and (3) Department of
Justice consent decrees. 57 While each of the methods has its
advantages and disadvantages, this Article will focus on private
racial profiling claims brought against law enforcement agencies
alleging racial profiling practices that violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58
respective percentages within the population of New York City").
54. See GALLUP POLL ORGANIZATION, RACIAL PROFILING IS SEEN AS WIDESPREAD,
PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUNG BLACK MEN (Dec. 9, 1999) (indicating that fifty-nine
percent of Americans polled believed that racial profiling by the police is
widespread and that eighty-one percent of the American public disapproved of the
practice), available at http://www.gallup.com/subscription/?m=f&c-id=10343 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2003).
55. Garrett, supra note 23, at 60. Racial profiling claims also arise in criminal
litigation, but such claims are beyond the scope of this Article. One interesting
question raised in criminal litigation of a racial profiling claim is whether the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should have an
exclusionary rule similar to the one contained within the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an
Exclusionary Rule Under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107
(arguing that an exclusionary rule should exist under the Equal Protection Clause).
56. See UNIV. OF MINN. INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, COMPONENTS OF RACIAL
PROFILING LEGISLATION (2001) [hereinafter INST. ON RACE & POVERTY] (indicating
that as of 2000, eleven states had enacted legislation to combat racial profiling, and
in 2001, another thirteen states introduced bills aimed at the same purpose),
available at
http://www.instituteonraceandpoverty.org/publications/racialprofiling.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2003); see also End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th
Cong. §§ 101, 501(5) (2001) (purporting to define and prohibit racial profiling),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_congjbills&docid--f:s989is.txt.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
57. See White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 413-14 (D.N.J. 2002) (describing
the provisions of a consent decree entered into between the Department of Justice
and the State of New Jersey); see also United States v. New Jersey & Div. of State
Police of the N. J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/jointapp.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
58. See infra notes 60-107 and accompanying text. There is another common
constitutional argument under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). This argument, however, is beyond
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, in 1996 the Supreme Court decided Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and in doing so severely limited, if not
eliminated, the Fourth Amendment racial profiling argument. See id. at 813
(holding that "[s]ubjective intentions [of the investigating agent] play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis"). Thus, after Whren, the
only relevant question under the Fourth Amendment is whether the officer had
legal cause for the stop. Id. Therefore, race will not even be considered in a Fourth
Amendment analysis as long as agents can indicate that other factors justified the
stop, including even the most minor traffic violations. See id.
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II. Private Racial Profiling Suits Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to bring private claims
against the government alleging violations of their constitutional
rights. 59 Specifically, § 1983 "imposes civil liability upon any
person, who acting under the color of state law, deprives another
individual of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution."60 Section 1983 does not a create a new substantive
right-rather, it is a remedy for "violations of rights conferred in
the Constitution."61  Section 1983 liability attaches to a
governmental entity or an individual governmental official. 62 It is
§ 1983 that permits an individual to bring a private racial profiling
claim alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 3
To bring a successful § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must navigate
through the judicial obstacle course of an Equal Protection claim.64
First, plaintiffs must show that actions of the government have
had a discriminatory or harmful effect on them.65 Second, they
must show that the discriminatory effect was the intended or
purposeful result of those actions. 66 However, even if the plaintiffs
offer proof of a purposeful discriminatory effect, the government's
actions are not immediately invalidated. Instead, the burden
merely shifts, and the government must show that its actions
survive the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test.67
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
60. Id.
61. See White, 179 F. Supp. at 418 (D.N.J. 2002) (explaining a Section 1983 suit).
62. Id. at 418, citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3rd Cir. 1989)
(explaining a § 1983 suit).
63. There are statutes beyond the scope of this Article that may provide
additional relief for racial profiling, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.").
65. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
66. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 ("Proof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.");
see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42 ("But our cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.").




To show discriminatory effect in a private racial profiling
suit, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been harmed by a
government action. Specifically, plaintiffs must show that they
have been treated differently than similarly situated persons who
are not of the same race. 68 Differential treatment can generally be
shown in one of two ways. First, a plaintiff can point to a specific
similarly situated individual or group of individuals that were
treated differently.6 9  Second, plaintiffs can present statistical
evidence indicating that they have been treated differently than
other similarly situated individuals. 70
Most often in racial profiling suits, plaintiffs offer only
statistical data as evidence because it is usually impossible to
name a specific individual or group that was treated differently.71
Plaintiffs usually point to statistical data indicating that racial
minorities are being disproportionately stopped, searched,
arrested, and incarcerated.7 2  For example, plaintiffs in New
Jersey used an independent study of the New Jersey Turnpike to
show "that African-Americans were 4.85 times more likely to be
that if discriminatory effect motivated by discriminatory purpose is shown then
"the burden shifts to the Government to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for treating Plaintiff differently than other similarly situated individuals").
68. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ("To establish a
discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."); see also Hurn, 221 F. Supp.
2d at 500 ("To show discriminatory effect, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she is a
member of a protected class and that similarly situated members of an unprotected
class were treated dissimilarly.").
69. See generally Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467-68 (providing an example of a
plaintiff being able to point to specific similarly situated persons in a jury selection
case).
70. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (evaluating statistical data
to determine purposeful discrimination); see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (stating
that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another"); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 ("Sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare." (citations
omitted)); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 637-40 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that statistical data can be used to show purposeful discrimination).
71. See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 639-40 ("In a civil racial profiling case, however, the
similarly situated requirement might be impossible to prove .... [Because unlike]
a meritorious selective prosecution claim .. .plaintiffs who allege that they were
stopped due to racial profiling would not . . . be able to provide the names of other
similarly situated motorists who were not stopped.").
72. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996)
(providing an example of a case in which statistical evidence of disproportionate
stops on the New Jersey Turnpike was used to show discriminatory effect).
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stopped on the Turnpike than non-African-Americans.."73
The discriminatory effects of racial profiling extend beyond
intrusive searches and seizures. For instance, studies indicate
that victims of racial profiling "experience fear, anxiety,
humiliation, anger, resentment, and cynicism."74  There is also
evidence that the pervasive nature of racial profiling has caused
considerable strain in the relations between communities of color
and law enforcement agencies.7 5
B. Purposeful Discriminatory Effect
The Supreme Court will not invalidate a law solely upon a
plaintiffs showing of a discriminatory effect. 76 The plaintiff must
show that the discriminatory effect was somehow the purpose of a
particular government action.77  The Supreme Court's usual
practice is to only invalidate government actions that purposefully
discriminate against persons. 78
Generally, plaintiffs attempt to show that a discriminatory
effect was purposeful in one of three ways. 79 First, plaintiffs may
73. See id. at 360; see also White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (D.N.J.
2002) (detailing the evidence presented in Soto, 734 A.2d 350).
74. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(8) (2001) (finding
that racial profiling is harmful to individuals who are "subjected to it"), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong.bills&docid=f:s989is.txt.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2003). See Rogers, supra note 47, at 94 (quoting Rep. John Conyers Jr., D-Mich., as
stating that "[raced-based traffic stops turn driving, one of our most ordinary and
fundamentally American activities, into an experience fraught with danger and
risk for people of color").
75. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 34, at 4 ("Recent survey data ... confirm[s] a
strong connection between perceptions of race-based stops by police and animosity
toward local and state law enforcement."). The report also highlighted a 1999
Gallup Poll which indicated that:
Eighty-five percent of White respondents had a favorable response toward
local police and 87 percent of White respondents had a favorable response
toward state police. Black respondents, overall, had a less favorable
opinion of both state and local police, with just 58 percent having a
favorable opinion of local police and 64 percent having a favorable
response to the state police. Fifty-three percent of Black men between
ages 18 and 34 said they had been treated unfairly by local police.
Id. See also S. 989, § 2(a)(9) ("Racial profiling damages law enforcement and the
criminal justice system as a whole by undermining public confidence and trust in
the police, the courts and the criminal law.").
76. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[Olur cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act . . .is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
77. See id.
78. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 229, 265 (1977);
Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
79. Barnhill v. City of Chicago, Police Dep't., 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 964 (N.D. Ill.
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point to a law or policy that "expressly classifies persons on the
basis of race."8 0 Second, when a law or policy is facially neutral, a
plaintiff may show that it was "applied in a discriminatory
fashion."81  Third, a plaintiff may try to show that a facially
neutral law or policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
8 2
In private racial profiling suits, plaintiffs generally attempt
to show purposeful discrimination under the second method-
unequal application of facially neutral laws.8 3  Specifically,
plaintiffs will rely on statistics to show patterns of unequal
application of facially neutral laws, because when statistical data
presents a stark pattern of dissimilar treatment, the courts may
infer purposeful discrimination.8 4
For the most part, courts are rarely persuaded that the
plaintiffs evidence is strong enough to show "a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race."8 5 As a result, courts
will dismiss racial profiling suits unless plaintiffs produce
additional evidence indicating that the discriminatory effect was
purposeful.86
As additional evidence, plaintiffs will offer testimony of
2001).
80. See id. ("First, a law or policy is discriminatory on its face if it expressly
classifies persons on the basis of race." (citing Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180
F.3d 42, 47 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200,
213, 227-29 (1995))).
81. See Barnhill, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 964 ("Second, a law or policy which is
facially neutral violates equal protection if it is applied in a discriminatory
fashion." (citing Hayden, 180 F.3d at 47 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886))); see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42.
82. See Barnhill, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 964 ("Third, and lastly, a facially neutral law
or policy violates equal protection if it was motivated by discriminatory animus and
its application results in a discriminatory effect." (citing Hayden, 180 F.3d at 47
(citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252, 264-65))).
83. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 23, at 61 (indicating that plaintiffs in private
racial profiling claims "must first allege a pattern or practice of police behavior that
is sufficient to satisfy requirements for injunctive relief').
84. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356,at 369-70 (evaluating statistical data to determine
purposeful discrimination); see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 ("[Ain invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than
another."); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 ("Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. The
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare." (citations
omitted)); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 637-40 (7th Cir. 2001), (holding
that statistical data can be used to show purposeful discrimination).
85. See Hurn v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 2d 493, 501 (D.N.J. 2002)
("Statistical data, by itself, can support an inference of discrimination, but must be
coupled with additional evidence to permit a finding a [sic] discriminatory intent.").
86. See id.
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government agents8 7 that demonstrates an implied policy, training
program, or overall department attitude that encourages the use
of racial profiling tactics.8 8 However, in the face of such evidence,
law enforcement agencies typically deny the existence of any racial
profiling policies for fear of being labeled racist.8 9 In fact, it is
often the case that law enforcement agencies claim that they
prohibit the use of racial profiling.90
To avoid the "he said, she said" problems of testimonial
evidence, plaintiffs almost exclusively rely on statistics to prove an
implied policy of racial profiling.91 But, as noted above, courts
generally find that the statistical data presented is insufficient to
make an inference of discriminatory purpose.92 On the whole,
statistical data is insufficient because law enforcement agencies
usually keep limited statistics or none at all.93 In response,
several states have created legislation requiring law enforcement
agencies to compile racial profiling statistics. 94 However, even the
new statistical data often fails to persuade the court to find a
87. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996)
("After hearing the testimony of Kenneth Ruff and Kenneth Wilson, two former
troopers called by the defense . . . who said they were trained and coached to make
race based 'profile' stops.").
88. See Harold A. McDougall, For Critical Race Practitioners: Race, Racism and
American Law (4th ed.) by Derrick A. Bell, 46 How. L.J. 1, 11 n.40 (2002) ("Christie
Todd Whitman, Governor of New Jersey, conceded that New Jersey State troopers
had been given instructions to target black and Hispanic motorists on the New
Jersey Turnpike, as possible drug couriers." (citing Matthew Purdy, Amnesia Runs
Rampant in Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at B1)); see also Alberto B.
Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren: Searching for Objective Evidence of the Fourth
Amendment on the Nation's Roads, 90 KY. L.J. 75, 107 (2001-2002) ("For example,
one New Jersey trooper testified that he had been taught about racial profiling
during various DEA seminars. The New Jersey officer testified that he 'was
directed and urged to stop and search persons who fit the profile if [he] wanted to
make 'good arrests."" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
89. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 43 ("Lawyers hope to show intentional
discrimination, while police try to avoid being labeled racist.").
90. See CLEARY, supra note 24, at 9.
91. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 84, 85 and accompanying text.
93. See GAO RACIAL PROFILING, supra note 30, at 5-6 ("Lack of empirical
information on the existence and prevalence of racial profiling has led to calls for
local law enforcement to collect data on which motorists are stopped, and why.").
94. For example, as of 2000, eleven states had enacted legislation to combat
racial profiling, and in 2001, another thirteen states introduced bills aimed at the
same purpose. See INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, supra note 56. Additionally, it has
been argued that federal legislation is also needed. See D.J. Silton, U.S. Prisons
and Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW &
INEQ. 53, 83-86 (2002). In 2001, such a bill was introduced. See End Racial
Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001).
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purposeful discriminatory effect. 95
C. Strict Scrutiny
If a plaintiff is able to demonstrate a purposeful
discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the law enforcement
agency and its actions are examined under the Supreme Court's
strict scrutiny test.96  The strict scrutiny test constitutionally
invalidates any government action that is not "necessary" to
promote a "compelling" governmental interest.9
7
Many law enforcement agencies and commentators defend
racial profiling as a tool that promotes the governmental interest
of eradicating drugs and crime. 98 Proponents of racial profiling
argue that racial profiling is a rational and efficient conclusion
drawn from law enforcement statistics that indicate that
particular racial groups disproportionately commit certain
crimes. 99 Most commonly, they point to arrest and incarceration
rates showing overrepresentation by particular racial groups. 100
Proponents of racial profiling also believe that it may prove to
deter crime, because when certain races know they are more likely
to be investigated they will be more likely to fear apprehension
95. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (holding
that the New Jersey State Patrol had engaged in de facto practices of racial
profiling). In Soto, there was a great deal of empirical evidence that the State
Patrol had engaged in practices of racial profiling. Id. at 352-57. However, the
court's finding of de facto racial profiling was based only partly on the statistical
data, since the state admitted that its police engaged in racial profiling. See White
v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410-12 (D.N.J. 2002) (discussing Soto, 734 A.2d
350).
96. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]Ill legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
97. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) ('Ve further held that a
classification that had the effect of imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right
to travel violated the Equal Protection Clause 'unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest."'); Burnson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
221 citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (indicating that under strict
scrutiny, state actions are "unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that
such ... [actions] are 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest").
98. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 56 ("Some police and commentators openly
defend policies targeting minorities as sound law enforcement ....").
99. See CLEARY, supra note 24, at 10 (indicating that some authorities defend
racial profiling "as appropriate given the different patterns of crime involvement by
different racial groups").
100. See id. (showing that in 1996, federal data indicated that "blacks, who made
up approximately 12.8 percent of the nation's population, represented 43.2 percent
of the persons arrested for ... violent crimes, and 32.4 percent of persons arrested
for ... property crimes").
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and therefore will refrain from illegal action. 101
Opponents of racial profiling, on the other hand, argue that
proponents employ flawed logic because as law enforcement
agencies disproportionately target racial minorities for routine
investigations, the arrest and incarceration rates of racial
minorities will naturally and undoubtedly increase.1 0 2  Racial
profiling becomes "a self-fulfilling prophecy where law
enforcement agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves
generated as a result of the discretionary allocation of resources
and targeted drug enforcement efforts. ' ' o Opponents of racial
profiling also argue that even if one believes that racial profiling
has some reasonable practical applications, mere reasonableness
is an insufficient justification when analyzed under the strict
scrutiny test.10 4 The use of arrest statistics as a justification for
racial profiling fails to recognize the fact that "very few minorities
commit crimes."10 5
101. See id. at 10-11 ("A related rationale for racial profiling is that it may help
to deter some crimes.").
102. See Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (N.D. Ill.
2000) ("[R]acial profiling is a self-fulfilling prophecy."); David Rudovsky, Law
Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and
Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 310 (2001) ("To a large extent,
these statistics have been used to grease the wheels of a vicious cycle-a self-
fulfilling prophecy where law enforcement agencies rely on arrest data that they
themselves generated ....") (quoting PETER VERNIERO, ATT'Y GEN. OF N.J.,
INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF
RACIAL PROFILING 68 (Apr. 20, 1999), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm-419.pdf).
103. David Rudovsky, Breaking the Pattern of Racial Profiling, 38 TRIAL 29, 30
(2002); see also Buckman & Lamberth, supra note 31, at 388 (characterizing the
current drug laws as new Jim Crow laws). "A hue and cry of politicians to get
tough on or 'declare war' on drugs from the early 80s well into the 90s produced a
corresponding effort by police departments to show results. Using simplistic and
circular logic, police focused on minorities .... Id.
104. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973)
(indicating that the strict scrutiny test is a more stringent test than the mere
rationality test). Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that
under the mere rationality test a governmental action will be upheld "so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end") with Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 207 (1999) (stating that a state
action challenged under the strict scrutiny test is required to "be narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest").
105. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 56-57. Garrett indicates that:
The contention that profiling is poor police work is reinforced by studies
that consistently show that very few of these mass pretextual stops result
in arrests. In New Jersey, for example, while vastly disproportionate
numbers of minorities were stopped, fewer than one percent of stops
resulted in arrests. Further, almost all motorists stopped had violated




III. The School Desegregation Cases
The purposeful discriminatory effect requirement of an Equal
Protection claim has made it very difficult for plaintiffs to shift the
burden of proof to the government in racial profiling claims.
10 6
However, the Supreme Court's treatment of school segregation and
desegregation represents a string of decisions that were primarily
concerned with the practice's discriminatory effects, and not
whether the discriminatory effects were presently purposeful.
10 7
A. The Unconstitutionality of Segregation
In 1896, the Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson'0 s and
judicially validated the Segregation Era.10 9 Plessy's infamous
"separate but equal"1 10 standard legitimized the use of segregation
laws, more commonly known as "Jim Crow" '111  laws, that
purported to treat members of different races "equally, albeit
separately." 2
School segregation was the standard throughout the
Segregation Era. In Brown /,113 however, the Supreme Court
declared school segregation unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.1 14 The decision officially rejected the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy,115 and held that "in the field of public
106. See Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Test and Subjective Bias: Some Problems
of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 559 (1998)
("[M]ost of the judicial efforts to eliminate racism have focused on a particularly
ugly strain of the problem: intentional discrimination by state actors." (citation
omitted)); see also Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205-07 (3rd Cir. 2002);
see also Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 634-42 (7th Cir. 2001) (dismissing
equal protection claim because plaintiff did not satisfy burden of showing
purposeful discrimination). See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265,
324 (1999) (discussing the difficulties of bringing a private equal protection claim,
specifically the need for an "attractive plaintiff').
107. See infra notes 108-155 and accompanying text.
108. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
109. See id. at 550-52 (holding that a statute requiring railroads carrying
passengers to provide equal but separate accommodations for White and "colored"
persons was not unconstitutional).
110. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 33, at 87.
112. See id.
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. See id. at 494-95.
115. See id. ("Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected."). Brown I did not officially hold segregation unconstitutional, but in a
series of brief per curiam orders following Brown I, the Court held segregation in
other public facilities unconstitutional. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (holding state required segregation at public beaches
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education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."1 1 6 In
Bolling v. Sharpe,117 decided the same day as Brown I, the Court
extended the ruling of Brown I to schools under federal
jurisdiction, such as those in the District of Columbia, on the basis
that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to
any proper governmental objective . . .118 In both cases, the
Court found "[s]eparate educational facilities ... [to be] inherently
unequal,''119 and therefore, unconstitutional.1 20
When the Court decided Brown I and Bolling, it was
primarily concerned with the discriminatory effects that
segregation had on African-American students and "the effect of
segregation itself on public education."1 21 Specifically, in Brown I,
the Court examined social scientific evidence and concluded that
the discriminatory effect of school segregation was threefold. 122
First, the Court was concerned that school segregation created a
"sense of inferiority" among African-American students. 123
Second, the Court determined that "[s]egregation . . . has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
Negro children."124  Finally, the Court felt that segregation
deprived all children of "the benefits they would receive in a
[racially] integrated school system."1 25
unconstitutional); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (holding state required
segregation at public golf courses unconstitutional); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (holding state required segregation on public buses unconstitutional); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (holding state
required segregation in public parks unconstitutional); Johnson v. Virginia, 373
U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (stating that it "is no longer open to question that a State may
not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities").
116. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
117. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
118. Id. at 500. Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70 (1995) suggested that "[s]egregation was not unconstitutional because
it might have caused psychological feelings of inferiority . . .[such] injury . . .is
irrelevant to the question whether [states] have engaged in intentional
discrimination-the critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of [equal protection]."
Id. at 121. However, this ignores the fact that at the time of Brown I, segregation
was an official policy that was considered constitutional. Also, such a reading of
Brown I would have to dismiss almost all of the Court's language regarding the
harm caused by school segregation. See infra notes 121-126 and accompanying
text.
119. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498-500.
120. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
121. See id. at 492.
122. Id. at 492-95.




B. Remedying Unconstitutional Segregation: The
Desegregation Model
One year after the Court declared school segregation
unconstitutional in Brown I, the Court decided Brown 11,126 and
laid out the basic design of the desegregation model. The
desegregation model consists of two principle duties. 127 First,
Brown H vested in all federal, state, and local public school
authorities the duty to desegregate. 128 Second, Brown II delegated
to the local courts the duty to enforce desegregation.
1 29
The duty to desegregate conferred upon all school authorities
"the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving"
their localized problems of segregation.1 30 This duty required
school authorities to implement desegregation plans in their
schools, but no plan, no matter how neutral, could have "the effect
of maintaining or increasing the degree of racial separation in the
schools." 131  The desegregation plans were to be implemented
"promptly" and in "good faith."'132 If additional time was needed,
the burden was on the authorities to show why more time should
be allowed. 133
The duty to enforce desegregation required the local courts to
evaluate whether school authorities had, in good faith, complied
with the duty to desegregate. 34 In considering the adequacy of
126. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
127. Id. at 298-99.
128. See id. Referring to Brown /'s declaration that school segregation is
unconstitutional, the Court stated that "[all provisions of federal, state, or local
law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle." Id. at
298.
129. See id. at 300-01.
130. See id. at 299 ("Full implementation of these constitutional principles may
require solution of varied local school problems.").
131. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation
Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1477 (1990). See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) ("However, if a state-imposed limitation on a
school authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a
unitary school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school system, it
must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of
federal constitutional guarantees.").
132. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 ("[T]he courts will require that ... [school
authorities] make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance.").
133. See id. at 299-300 ("The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that
such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith
compliance at the earliest practicable date.").
134. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299. The Court stated that:
[Clourts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible
need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases
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the desegregation plans, the local courts were to "be guided by
equitable principles," and thus act as courts of equity. 135 As courts
of equity, the local courts could "properly take into account the
public interest" and eliminate any obstacles standing in the way of
desegregation. 136 Also, as courts of equity, the local courts were to
consider the complications inherent in segregation when judging
the "good faith compliance" of desegregation plans. 137 The local
courts were to retain jurisdiction over the desegregation of the
local schools for whatever time was necessary. 138
After the Court laid out the design for desegregation in
Brown II, it remained silent on desegregation for several years. 39
During the Court's silence, the lower courts could not put teeth
into Brown 11 due to tremendous resistance in the South. 140 In
1958, the Court decided Cooper v. Aaron,14' and ruled that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 42 obligated the States to
comply with Brown I and JI. 143
In 1968 the Court decided Green v. County School Board,144
and shifted its focus from the "good faith" implementation of
desegregation plans to the "effects" of such plans.' 45 In Green, the
Court examined whether a "School Board's adoption of a 'freedom
of choice' plan which allows a pupil to choose his own public school
can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it
appropriate to remand the cases to those courts.
Id. at 299 (citation omitted).
135. See id. at 300.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 300-01. The Court stated that:
[Tihe courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from
the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation
system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into
compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.
Id.
138. See id. at 301 ("[T]he courts will retain jurisdiction of... [the desegregation]
cases.").
139. See Liebman, supra note 131, at 1476 (stating that the Court returned to
"the desegregation issue only intermittently and inconclusively during the next
thirteen years").
140. See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (detailing the Governor of
Arkansas' attempt to deny the entrance of Black students to Central High School in
Little Rock, Arkansas).
141. Id. at 1.
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. ('CThis Constitution ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ... .
143. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
144. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
145. See id. at 439.
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constitutes adequate compliance with the Board's responsibility"
to effectively desegregate its public schools. 146 The Court focused
on the effects of the plan and not on whether it was a product of
purposeful racial discrimination. 47 The "freedom of choice" plan
was tremendously ineffective and, while racially neutral, the
Court found the plan inadequate when measured against
desegregation requirements. 148 The Court acknowledged that a
"freedom of choice" plan may be acceptable at some times, but not
when there are "reasonably available other ways . . . promising
speedier and more effective [desegregation] ."149
Following Green, the Court continued to certify challenges to
desegregation plans adopted after Brown II, and demanded a
showing of effective results regardless of the school board's
intentions at the time. 150 The Court continually affirmed the duty
to desegregate even when there was no evidence of current or past
official segregation.151
The course of judicial enforcement of desegregation turned in
the early 1990s when a majority of the Supreme Court expressed
an unwillingness to continue judicial involvement in school
desegregation. 152 The Majority more readily found "good faith
146. See id. at 431-32. The Court stated:
The question for decision is whether, under all the circumstances here,
respondent School Board's adoption of a 'freedom-of-choice' plan which
allows a pupil to choose his own public school constitutes adequate
compliance with the Board's responsibility to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis ... 
Id.
147. Id. at 439 ("The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.").
148. See id. at 441 ("The New Kent School Board's 'freedom-of-choice' plan
cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to 'effectuate a transition' to a unitary
system.").
149. Id.
150. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971)
(holding that a court-approved desegregation was ineffective). The Court stated
that Black students and others similarly situated were "deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing
Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495).
151. In 1973, the Court ran into some difficulty when it started examining cases
in states where segregation was not a widespread policy. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist.,
413 U.S. 189, 198-205 (1973). However, the Court was able to find intentional
segregation in a few school districts. Id. The Court assumed that such
discrimination must have affected the rest of the state, and therefore intent was, in
a sense, transferred. See id. at 203-04.
152. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991). In Dowell, the Court
held that the desegregation decrees "are not intended to operate in perpetuity." Id.
The Court also held that in determining whether to dissolve a desegregation
decree, courts should consider whether a school district has complied in good faith
with a desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether vestiges of past
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compliance" and thus freed school authorities of the duty to
desegregate, even in the face of past intentional segregation. 153 On
the other hand, the Court's Minority criticized the Majority for
"suggesting that after 65 years of official segregation, thirteen
years of desegregation was enough." 154  In 1992, the Minority's
position prevailed and the Court extended the principle of an
affirmative duty to desegregate, as applied to public elementary
and high schools, to public colleges. 155
IV. Racial Profiling is Unconstitutional Segregation
A. Thinking of Racial Profiling as Racial Segregation
"Racial profiling is nothing but a 20th century version of
racial segregation."
- Rev. Al Sharpton 156
Earlier, this Article defined racial profiling as the practice of
using race as a proxy for criminality, 157 but it is also possible to
maintain that definition and think of racial profiling as
segregation. Segregation is defined as "the policy or practice of
separating people of different races, classes, or ethnic groups, as in
schools, housing, and public or commercial facilities,"'1 58 and while
it may not be immediately obvious, racial profiling is exactly that.
Racial profiling may not seem an obvious form of segregation
because the word "separating," as used in the definition of
segregation, is generally defined as "to set or put apart,"' 59 and
discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. See id. at 249-50;
see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (holding that a district court has the
power to relinquish control over a school district's desegregation policy even before
it has achieved full compliance).
153. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 467.
154. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1992) (holding that the
duties of desegregation apply to public colleges as well as public elementary and
high schools).
156. Tiffany Arnold, Summit Identifies Racial Profiling as Worst Civil Rights
Problem, THE DAILY ILLINI (April 23, 2001), available at
http://www.dailyillini.com/aprOl/apr23/news/stories/newsO5.shtml (last visited
Sept. 30, 2003); see also Steiner, supra note 33, at 443 (characterizing the drug laws
as the new Jim Crow Laws).
157. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
158. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1577
(4th ed. 2000).




racial profiling is rarely referred to as such.16° On the other hand,
"separating" is also defined as "to ... distinguish .. . between,"'161
and this alternative definition can easily be equated with racial
profiling because racial profiling most certainly involves making a
distinction between people of different races based on the
propensity to commit crime.
Like segregation, racial profiling involves making a
distinction between people in public or commercial facilities.
162
Racial profiling most frequently occurs in public facilities, such as
airports, train stations, highways, and sidewalks, 163 and they are
very similar to, if not the same, public facilities that once
permitted segregation.' 64 Racial profiling can thus be thought of
as a policy or practice that separates by making a distinction
between people of different races in public and commercial
facilities. In other words, racial profiling is segregation.
B. Racial Profiling Equal Protection Analysis Compared to
School Segregation
Racial profiling is segregation, but is it the type of
segregation that the Supreme Court was concerned about in
Brown I and the subsequent line of cases? When the Court
declared school segregation unconstitutional in Brown I, it was
quite evident that the Court was rejecting the practice of setting or
keeping apart people of different races. 165 The record also shows
that the Court was just as concerned with the type of segregation
which involves "making a distinction."'' 66 The Court stated that
"as to their status in the community[,] 'the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro
group. ' ' 67 It is as if the Court was stating that segregation "uses
race as a proxy for status in the community." Consequently,
another way to think of school segregation is as the practice of
making a distinction between people of different races as to their
status in the community.
160. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (defining racial profiling as the
practice of using race as a proxy for criminality).
161. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 159, at 1328.
162. See, e.g., DRIVING WHILE BLACK, supra note 11.
163. See generally supra note 30 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 115.
165. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (indicating that the
state laws of the time had the effect of keeping White children apart from Black
children in the public school system).
166. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
167. See id. at 494.
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Thus, Brown I indicates that the Court was concerned with
segregation that involved "making a distinction between" people.
As a result, the constitutionality of racial profiling is suspect
under an Equal Protection Clause analysis. In fact, when racial
profiling segregation is compared to school segregation under the
structure of the Equal Protection Clause, it is clear that racial
profiling possesses the same unconstitutional characteristics of
school segregation.
1. Similar Discriminatory Effects
The discriminatory effects found in racial profiling are almost
identical to those in school segregation. First, like school
segregation, racial profiling may cause "feelings of inferiority as to
... status in the community." 168 Specifically, racial profiling could
cause feelings of inferiority among certain people in the "law-
abiding" community. The law of the United States presumes that
every person is innocent until proven guilty, 169  and this
presumption should have the effect of classifying all persons in the
United States as law-abiding until proven otherwise. However,
racial profiling nullifies this presumption by stereotyping certain
races as non-law-abiding. 170 By using racial profiling, government
agencies imply that certain races are basically a step up from the
lowest status one can have in the United States-that of a criminal,
or that they are inferior among the "law-abiding community."
Second, the Brown I Court believed that school segregation
had the "tendency to [retard] the education and mental
168. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
169. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979) (acknowledging the
"premise that an individual is to be treated as innocent until proven guilty");
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 616 (1976) (stating that "an accused
is presumed innocent until proven guilty") (appendix to the opinion of Brennan, J.,
concurring); see aico U.S. CONST. Amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without the due process of law.").
170. See Steiner, supra note 33, at 450. The article discussed the implications of
inferiority that racial profiling places upon racial minorities and stated:
[M]ore germane to our argument here, racially targeted criminal justice
policies have made critical investments in whiteness. Racial targeting on
the part of the criminal justice system, more specifically, erroneously
reinforces racial and ethnic minority identities as "criminal" and
"dangerous" at the same time that it erroneously reinforces white identity
as "law-abiding" and "innocent." That is to say, although race and
ethnicity are social and cultural constructions-as opposed to being
biological determinants-they speciously become proxies for who is




development of Negro children."171  The exact meaning of the
Court's comment is unclear, but it seems the Court believed that a
sense of inferiority affected 'the motivation of a child to learn,"'
and that lack of motivation decelerated a child's mental
development. 172 By this, the Court implied that the lack of
motivation caused by segregation led to a child's failure within the
educational system.
Racial profiling may have a similar effect. For example, if
certain races are separated into categories based on criminal
likelihood, then the motivation of members of those races to avoid
engaging in crime most likely diminishes. 17 3 If an individual is
assumed to be a criminal on no other indicia than race, that
individual's motivation to defeat the notion may vanish, and the
individual may feel there is no other viable option but to fall into
the stereotype.
Finally, the Brown I Court felt that school segregation
deprived Black students of several benefits they would otherwise
receive in a racially desegregated school system. 174  Racial
profiling also deprives affected persons of several benefits that
they would otherwise receive in a racially (de)profiled criminal
justice system. One such benefit is liberty. Racial profiling causes
members of racial minorities to be disproportionately stopped and
searched. Like the population as a whole, most members of racial
minorities are law-abiding citizens, but because of racial profiling,
many such individuals are being deprived of their liberty for no
reason other than the color of their skin.175
Another benefit eroded by racial profiling is the relationship
between affected persons and law enforcement agencies. The use
171. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1358 (2001) (explaining
the labeling theory as "the idea that the label of one as a deviant furthers one's self-
identification as a deviant"); Berit Winge, Mandatory Sentencing Laws and Their
Effect on Australia's Indigenous Population, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 693,
710-11 (2002) (describing some scholars' concept of the "labeling theory," which
assumes that '[individuals stigmatized as delinquent become what they are said
to be"') (quoting W. WILBANKS, THE INSERTION/DIVERSION DECISION AT THE
JUVENILE POLICE LEVEL 6-7 (1975)).
174. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 ("Segregation with the sanction of law.., has
a tendency to deprive [Black children] of some of the benefits they would receive in
a [racially] integrated school system.").
175. See Rogers, supra note 47, at 94 (quoting Rep. John Conyers, Jr., D-Mich.,
as stating that "[r]ace-based traffic stops turn driving, one of our most ordinary and
fundamentally American activities, into an experience fraught with danger and
risk for people of color").
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of racial profiling has strained relationships with and confidence
in law enforcement. 176  This strained relationship ostensibly
deprives affected persons of resources that can increase their
personal safety and deprives law enforcement agencies of
important crime-preventing information. If individuals have a bad
relationship with their law enforcement agencies, it is doubtful
that they will go to those agencies with helpful information.
Affected persons may at times even avoid law enforcement
agencies when their own personal safety is in question.
However, just because racial profiling and school segregation
have similar discriminatory effects does not mean that a court will
find racial profiling unconstitutional. As previously indicated,
discriminatory effect alone will not subject a claim of racial
profiling to the strict scrutiny test. It must also be shown that the
discriminatory effect was purposeful. 177
2. Dealing with Purposeful Discriminatory Effect in Racial
Profiling Cases as it was Dealt with in the School
Desegregation Cases
When the Court decided Brown I and II, school segregation
was a publicly recognized, state-sanctioned practice.178 There was
no question of whether the segregation was purposeful. 179 In
contrast, purposeful segregation was, at the time, absent in many
of the desegregation cases following Brown I and II.180 Regardless,
the Court inferred a purposeful discriminatory effect from the
historical background of school segregation.18 ' The Court was
primarily concerned with the discriminatory effects of school
segregation and how such harm could be remedied. 8 2
Today, most law enforcement agencies deny the existence of
racial profiling policies.1s 3  Courts are reluctant to infer such
policies from statistical evidence of discriminatory effect.' 8 4
176. See supra note 75.
177. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1 (discussing segregated school
cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware).
179. See id.
180. See supra notes 126-155 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
focus on remedying school segregation with seemingly little emphasis on whether
the segregated conditions were purposely maintained by the schools).
181. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
("The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if
it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.").
182. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
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Plaintiffs are unable to gather adequate statistical evidence
because law enforcement agencies compile sub-par data or none at
all.18 5 Each of these factors has made a showing of purposeful
discriminatory effect in racial profiling cases very difficult, if not
impossible.
However, like school segregation, racial profiling has a
historical background of purposeful discriminatory effect. The
concept of racial profiling descended directly from the DEA "drug
courier profile."18 6  It was the federally endorsed Operation
Pipeline that aggressively championed the use of the "drug courier
profile." 18 7 It was the states' participation in Operation Pipeline
and other similar drug enforcement operations that employed
racially biased enforcement techniques.188  These techniques
caused the arrest and incarceration rates for racial minorities to
skyrocket.189
Statistics indicate that racial minorities are
disproportionately targeted for investigation of criminal
conduct.1 90 Confessions of law enforcement agents around the
country have established the existence of racial profiling
policies. 191 Yet even in the face of such evidence, the courts
remain reluctant to find purposeful discrimination unless it is
shown that a law enforcement agency employs a policy of racial
profiling.192
The historical use of racial profiling has created lasting
effects on individuals and communities. 193 The Court must view
185. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of
racial profiling from the "drug courier profile").
187. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (evidencing the increase in the
number of minorities incarcerated after implementation of the "drug courier
profile").
190. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
191. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 51 (noting the admission by New Jersey state
police of the use of racial profiling).
192. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
193. See Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1979). The court stated:
Since until the past decade there had been [purposeful] discrimination in
many facets of Moultrie government, including voting for public office, the
inference is strong that the disproportions in voter registration and elected
officials are at least in part a result of the past pervasive discrimination in
Moultrie. The district court found that there was no evidence supporting
such an inference and concluded instead that it is equally likely that the
reason for the disproportion in voter registration is that the "leaders in the
black community" have failed "to ignite the patriotic fervor of their
brothers." This misallocated the burden of proof on the issue of present
2004]
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the purposeful discrimination requirement in racial profiling cases
as it did in the school desegregation cases. In the school
desegregation cases, the plaintiffs presented no evidence of
present purposeful discrimination, but the Court did not ignore
the fact that school segregation was unremedied past
discrimination. 194 The Court recognized the past intent and used
it to satisfy the requisite showing of purposeful discriminatory
effect. Like segregation, racial profiling has a long history of
discrimination that should not be ignored by the Court, but should
be used to satisfy the Court's requirement of purposeful
discriminatory effect.
3. The Strict Scrutiny Test
If the Court were to adopt the approach taken in the school
desegregation cases, it could then address the all-important
question of whether racial profiling is "necessary to promote a
compelling government interest."195 The government interest in
fighting crime and drugs will almost surely be considered
compelling, so the issue rests solely on the question of the
necessity of racial profiling. 196
Even though most law enforcement agencies currently deny
practicing of racial profiling, it still receives considerable support
for being an efficient and practical law enforcement technique. 197
If race accurately predicts an individual's propensity to commit
crime, then the use of racial profiling in law enforcement would
seem necessary. If, on the other hand, race does not accurately
predict an individual's propensity to commit crime, racial profiling
would seem to be an impractical and unnecessary crime
prevention technique. 9 8
effects of past discrimination. Once plaintiffs have demonstrated a history
of pervasive discrimination and a present disproportion in voting
registration and election of minority representatives, they have carried
their burden of proving that the past discrimination has present effects.
See id. at 881.
194. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
195. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 16, at 1414 (discussing the new issues of
racial profiling raised after the events of September 11, 2001, and questioning
whether post-September 11 Department of Justice practices are nonetheless
justified).
196. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (stating
that "[tihe eradication of illegal drugs from our State is an obviously worthy goal").
197. See supra notes 98- 101 and accompanying text.
198. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S. 989, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2001)
(finding that "racial profiling is not an effective means to uncover criminal
activity"), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong-bills&docid=f:s989is.txt.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
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To the dismay of racial profiling supporters, race is not an
accurate predictor of criminal likelihood. It is true that racial
minorities are disproportionately represented in arrest and
incarceration statistics,199 but studies consistently indicate that
race is not an accurate predictor of criminality. For example, a
2001 Department of Justice report found that members of
minorities were more commonly stopped and searched than
Whites, but less likely to be in possession of contraband. 20 0 A 1999
study of the New Jersey Turnpike indicated that people of color
constituted 40.6 percent of all stops made and 77.2 percent of all
searches conducted. 20 ' The results of the searches produced
contraband on 10.5 percent of White motorists and 13.5 percent of
Black motorists. 20 2
Since race fails to accurately predict an individual's
criminality, it must follow that racial profiling is not necessary to
promote the government's compelling interest of eradicating crime
and illegal drugs. "The eradication of [crime and] illegal drugs...
is an obviously worthy goal, but not at the expense of individual
rights."203 Racial profiling violates the individual rights of racial
minorities but fails to advance the war on crime and drugs. Racial
profiling must be declared unconstitutional under the strict
scrutiny test.
V. The Racial (De)Profiling Model
Once a court determines, through the previous analysis or on
other grounds, that racial profiling is unconstitutional, its
equitable powers to remedy the wrong are broad.20 4 While the
courts are free to award anything from injunctive relief to
damages, one approach is to replicate the design utilized in the
2003).
199. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
200. See S. 989 at § 2(a)(5) (summarizing a 2001 Department of Justice report's
findings that "although African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be
stopped and searched, they were less likely to be in possession of contraband"). The
Department of Justice's findings further indicated that "[o]n average, searches and
seizures of African-American drivers yielded evidence only eight percent of the
time, searches and seizures of Hispanic drivers yielded evidence only 10 percent of
the time, and searches and seizures of White drivers yielded evidence 17 percent of
the time." Id.
201. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.
202. Id. at 7-8.
203. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
204. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
("Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad.").
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desegregation cases. Specifically, courts should (1) confer upon
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies the affirmative
duty to (de)profile, and (2) confer upon local courts the duty to
enforce and evaluate the (de)profiling efforts of local law
enforcement agencies. 205
A. Duty to (De)Profile
As with the desegregation cases and the duty to desegregate,
the Court should vest in all law enforcement agencies the duty to
(de)profile. The duty to (de)profile would require these agencies to
elucidate, assess, and solve the localized problems of racial
profiling. 206  It would also require agencies to develop and
implement plans to ensure that race is not equated with
criminality. Such plans should consist of race-neutral training,
increased community involvement and cooperation, accurate data
collection, status reports to the court, and appropriate statistical
analysis.207 Finally, the duty to (de)profile would require law
enforcement agencies to refrain from any action that unnecessarily
endorses or increases the degree of racial disparity caused by
racial profiling.208 Law enforcement agencies could then no longer
justify law enforcement practices with arrest statistics that
perpetuate circular justification for discriminatory law
enforcement tactics.
Vesting law enforcement agencies with the duty to remedy
racial profiling encourages law enforcement accountability. First,
the plaintiffs burden of showing purposeful discriminatory effect
would be absolved in subsequent litigation. Plaintiffs would only
need to present evidence of discriminatory effect and the courts
would infer purpose.20 9 The law enforcement agency would be left
to account for the disproportionate statistics. 210 Second, in order
to avoid litigation costs, law enforcement agencies would be forced
to work with the communities. Third, law enforcement agencies
would have to bear, or at least equitably spread, the costs of
keeping adequate statistics. And, finally, law enforcement
agencies would be forced to implement checks and balances on the
205. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
207. See Silton, supra note 94, at 83-86 (indicating various remedial actions that
should be taken to eradicate racial profiling).
208. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text (detailing how the Court's
attention to discriminatory effects in the desegregation cases shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant school board).
210. See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:73
RACIAL (DE)PROFILING
discretion of their agents.
B. Duty to Enforce Racial (De)Profiling
1. Judicial Oversight
In the desegregation cases, the courts maintained jurisdiction
to monitor the "good faith implementation" of desegregation
plans.211 Similarly, the courts should maintain jurisdiction and a
watchful eye over the good faith implementation of racial
(de)profiling plans. The courts should act as courts of equity,
taking "into account the public interest"212 and eliminating any
obstacles standing in the way of racial (de)profiling.213 The goal of
the judiciary should be to ensure the speedy implementation of
(de)profiling plans while taking into account the complications
inherent in racial (de)profiling.214
In future racial profiling claims, the courts should be
primarily concerned with evidence indicating discriminatory
effect.215 The courts should not be satisfied with facially neutral
practices that do not achieve adequate results, as with the
"freedom of choice" plans implemented in many of the school
districts following Brown I and 11.216 Finally, the courts must
ensure that it is the law enforcement agencies' burden to show
that a racial (de)profiling plan is effective once the plaintiff has
shown discriminatory effect.21 7
2. Determining Effectiveness
The Court does not need to require perfect symmetry between
stop and arrest statistics and actual racial representation in
society, but it is appropriate to use such parity as a starting point
to determine effectiveness. As Justice Burger stated, "[t]he
constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that
every school in every community must always reflect the racial
composition of the school system as a whole."218 But "[a]wareness
211. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II); see also
supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
212. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
213. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
214. See Brown I, 349 U.S. at 299; see also supra notes 130-138 and
accompanying text (detailing the Supreme Court's progressive displeasure with the
progress of school desegregation).
215. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 126-138, 145, 147, 150 and accompanying text.
218. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
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of the racial composition of the whole school system is likely to be
a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past
constitutional violations. 219 Therefore, courts should not expect to
see perfect symmetry between criminal and population statistics,
but rather adequate advancement toward such a result.
Courts should also look to the testimony of members of racial
minorities within their respective jurisdictions when reviewing
racial (de)profiling plans. Testimony, after all, was one of the most
prominent methods of establishing the existence and severity of
racial profiling.220  Additionally, attitude surveys are proper
evaluation tools for measuring the effects of racial (de)profiling
plans. 221 Finally, the courts should retain jurisdiction over racial
(de)profiling plans for whatever time is necessary.
Conclusion
Racial profiling is another form of segregation that, when
compared to school segregation, must be declared unconstitutional
and remedied. No longer should courts turn a blind eye to the fact
that racial profiling is a state-sanctioned policy that has continued
to perpetuate inequality in the Unites States criminal justice
system. Other remedies, such as legislation and consent decrees,
have been slow to remedy racial profiling, but judicial involvement
could be a catalyst for racially neutral law enforcement. Racial
profiling has, existed much too long, resulting in serious
detrimental effects to communities and to individual liberty. The
time has come to impose upon law enforcement agencies the
requirement of non-discrimination in suspicion of criminality. The
school desegregation cases waged a steadfast campaign against
segregation in public schools, and now the Court must combat
racial profiling with a similar strategy: racial (de)profiling.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (indicating the importance of law
enforcement agent testimony).
221. See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 34, at 4 (providing an example of an attitude
survey providing data on the attitudes of members of racial minorities and its
correlation with racial profiling).
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